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1. Identities as political and contextual 
 
Paul Gilbert‟s book Cultural Identity and Political Ethics represents one of the 
recent relevant challenges to the politics of identity, or politics based on cul-
tural claims. Contrary to ambitions of supporters of identity or cultural poli-
tics to show metaphysical depth in cultures or identities as the ground for 
strong political requirements, Gilbert sees in cultures mainly a political di-
mension. Why do culturalists and identitists insist so much on metaphysical 
depth? The reason is that cultural features can be the basis for the require-
ment of special treatment with the strength that identitists and culturalists 
remark only if they refer to something deeply constitutive of people‟s identi-
ty, i.e. something which, if neglected, impairs the psychological functioning of 
individuals. However, Gilbert says, a proper discussion of the matter does not 
give any stable foundation for the strong claims of supporters of identity poli-
tics. In particular, what follows from the discussion is that identity is adapta-
ble, and, so, there is no ground for the requirement to secure it in its actual 
form, as it is often claimed. 
Gilbert‟s discussion leads to the conclusion that the account of cultural 
identity made by those who make political claims based on it depends on 
what purposively delimits the group. So, for example, in a particular context 
it is language that is taken as dominant (for example, in the requirement of 
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secession from a large imperial state), while religion may be dominant in a 
second moment (for example, because there is a new requirement of recogni-
tion inside the group that obtained its political organization after the seces-
sion from the empire). In this process, identity-group activists try to convince 
their members that there is a feature particularly important for them, either 
inviting them to a process of self-recognition, or remarking the objective im-
portance of that feature (for example, the superiority of a moral outlook). To 
this, Gilbert says that “many different examples could be adduced, each ad-
vocating attachment to a specific identity as ethically required or desirable. 
But again it is hard to see what general arguments might be provided, and 
thus for each there are likely to be ethical counter-arguments for different at-
tachments, so that no particular cultural component of identity seems ethi-
cally privileged”. (Gilbert, 2010, 63-64) 
The crucial idea that Gilbert puts forward is that people are not distin-
guished pre-politically on the base of supposed deep objective cultural differ-
ences. This is a thesis about the relevance of cultural differences in delimiting 
groups in a way that has political consequences. All divisions into separate 
cultural groups have an external explanation related to material and political 
circumstances. The shape of these groups depends on such circumstances, 
where it is extremely important that a group is put into specific circums-
tances by the actions and positions of others. Gilbert describes some of these 
conditions. It is important to remark that the relevant opposition of Gilbert‟s 
classification is toward doctrines that establish cultural identities on the 
ground of supposed deep features shared by all those who are part of a cultur-
al group. The first circumstance that Gilbert analyzes is the one that gives 
ground to identity as standing. I will show briefly Gilbert‟s discussion of iden-
tity as standing, because it will be relevant for the following part of the paper.  
Identity as standing appears as a reaction to a form “of insecurity shared  
between members of some groups who find themselves treated similarly by 
others”. (Gilbert, 2010, 71) These people feel as being under-evaluated by 
others and their reaction consists in forming a view of themselves that confers 
self-worth. This constitutes identity as standing. By the self-perception that 
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results, people feel pride in themselves and “experience the self-worth of 
which the contempt of others threatened to deprive them”. (Gilbert, 2010, 72) 
Identity as standing is the base of political aspirations that vary from the 
requirement of the right to regulate the life of the community according to its 
own norms, to that of a separate state. People do not need to have the com-
mon cultural identity affirmed as identity as standing before the identifica-
tion I am speaking about, in particular not a common deep identity. They 
recognize each other because they feel that they share the same circums-
tances, i.e. the same threat.  
A particularly important remark that Gilbert offers in this discussion is 
that, contrary to what influent authors think, the need for respect is not 
equivalent to that of recognition from the other group (typically, I suppose, 
the recognition of a minority from a majority). Respect may not be relevant, 
because the group fearing for humiliation may disdain the other group, and, 
therefore, do not find any importance in its respect. Or, the other group can 
recognize it by meeting its political demands, but, at the same time, not re-
spect it. The relevant sense of respect included in identity as standing is self-
respect.   
With such political and contextual characterization of identity as stand-
ing, as well as of other forms of identities, Gilbert has accomplished his plan 
of offering an explanation and support to his claim that cultural differences 
are better not understood as something objective and constitutive of deep 
identity. Moreover, the identification of people with different groups depends 
on specific circumstances and on the question to which identification provides 
an answer.  
A relevant conclusion of Gilbert‟s discussion is that, because of the fact 
that persons do not have a deep identity in virtue of being members of cul-
tures, there is no need for a cultural identity for their psychological function-
ing, and, consequently, identity has no value in supplying such a need. Gil-
bert explicates this position. He does not deny that cultural components are 
important for individual identities, in the sense of making them the sort of 
individuals they are. This, however, does not imply that one has identity in 
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terms of membership in a cultural group defined, among else, by language. 
Nor does it imply that even if a person has such a cultural identity, that iden-
tity has value for the person. All the value is explained by the language as 
such, and not by the additional fact of cultural membership. To see this, we 
may add the consideration that one can make use of a language without being 
member of the cultural group that originally or typically uses that language. 
The same we can say about values and other aspects of identity. An individu-
al can take benefit of them without endorsing them so as to be culturally in-
volved. So, for example, an immigrant can endorse the values of the people 
were he came to live (let‟s say optimistically, those of human rights) without 
becoming a member of their cultural group.  
There are arguments denying this. These arguments insist on the impos-
sibility of separating elements of cultures, in order to enjoy their benefits. So, 
for example, the value of the culture consists in being internalized and, there-
fore, in being able to keep people together in an integrated society. But Gil-
bert has a good reply to this argument: it confuses cultures and communities. 
The latter can be multicultural, for example.  
An important consideration offered by Gilbert regards the distinction be-
tween the value of cultures for individuals, and the attribution of value to 
cultures. In the first case, we have a powerful requirement that concerns the 
protection of people in front of possible malfunctions that can threaten them. 
In the second case, we say that withholding recognition to cultures and re-
lated political requirements fails to give the due weight to the evaluations of 
adherents to cultures. This is, obviously, a less powerful requirement because 
of the fact that what people take to be due to them, is not necessarily due to 
them.   
In the former case we have a potentially stronger requirement, but Gil-
bert says that we must assess it, and he proposes to do this by being aware of 
the diversity of types of identity that he has described earlier. Each type 
brings a different value for individuals. Let‟s see it on the example of identity 
as standing that appears as one of the possible forms of identity that most 
strongly answers to a basic human need, i.e. self-respect (that is, for example, 
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taken by John Rawls to be a primary good). Gilbert agrees that self-respect is 
a universal human need, but although it is, it is still questionable whether its 
loss is experienced when one‟s cultural group is disvalued, and it is also ques-
tionable whether it can be answered by cultural identification. He offers an 
example to support his thesis: members of working class are frequently disva-
lued by members of upper classes, but it is not their typical reaction to find 
an identification that valorizes them. They simply ignore the attitudes of the 
upper classes. In general, Gilbert says that identity as standing is a possible 
reaction, but not an inevitable one and it depends on various political factors. 
Moreover, there is no reason to think that cultural identification can satisfy a 
general need of self-identification. Obviously, there are people who find their 
source of pride in national or cultural identity, but there are people who do 
not feel such pride, or even feel shame for their national or cultural belonging. 
There are people who find different sources of self-respect, like their family, 
local belonging, profession, etc.  
I find myself very much in sympathy with Gilbert‟s positions. Basically, 
I agree with him on the skepticism about the depth of distinctive cultural fea-
tures taken as bases for political claims, where by “political claims” I refer to 
three possible requirements: independent statehood, autonomy in a wider 
state, exceptions from general legislation. More precisely, I agree with Gil-
bert‟s position in opposition to identitists and culturalists, who in one way or 
another, find an objective foundation of identity and a relation between deep 
aspects of identity and political claims.  
I add some considerations to Gilbert‟s discussion, and these considera-
tions regard the issue of respect and recognition, as well as the stringency of 
demands posed by cultural commitments. I start with the latter issue.  
 
 
2. Subjective identity 
 
My departure point is represented by Bilgrami‟s distinction between the ob-
jective and the subjective conception of identity. The former is identity as 
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how it might be seen independently of how the person sees herself, while the 
latter corresponds to how the person conceives herself to be. (Bilgrami, 2006) 
To be sure, Bilgrami‟s primary intention is not to relate directly to the discus-
sion concerned with the political consequences of identity. Bilgrami is con-
cerned primarily with the description of identity. Nevertheless, I think that 
his proposal has important consequences for the present discussion. I start 
with a brief description of objective identity. 
Objective identity can match up with the conception according to which 
it corresponds to features that reveal the identity of the person by her exter-
nal behavior. This person may not endorse this identity, but the possession of 
some features appear as the best explanation of her behavior, these features 
appear as salient, and so constitute the basis for saying that they constitute 
the identity of the person. In this case, identity may be present although the 
subject does not identify with it, or does not even give out any external beha-
vior that reveals it. The political consequences of such a conception of identi-
ty are relevant. A group of people may feel as more competently aware of the 
identity of persons than those persons themselves. As such, they think that 
they have, for example, legitimacy to act for the achievement of autonomy 
and liberty of people on the base of what the self of these people really and 
objectively is, although these people are themselves unaware of these real and 
objective facts. Bilgrami offers the example of the proletarian identity in the 
Marxist theory, and the role of the vanguard in such a theory. Obviously, we 
may add the example of the role of national leaders, as well. It is such concep-
tions of identity and the related political projects that Gilbert‟s arguments 
successfully oppose. 
For the present discussion it is more important to see the description of 
subjective identity that Gilbert does not discuss. Subjective identity can be 
important for politics, as well. It comprises some intensely held self-
conception, like, for example, the strong commitment to being a member of a 
national or religious community. But intensity is not sufficient. One, for ex-
ample, can be alienated from, rather than identified with an intense desire 
that she has. So, Bilgrami thinks that it is important to dissipate an ambigui-
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ty, that between being aware of being something (for example, a Muslim, or 
an Italian), and valuing to be something. It is the latter that is relevant in the 
discussion of subjective identity. So, a reflective endorsement (which Bilgrami 
relates with second-order states of mind) of first-order states of mind (desires 
of something) is needed in order to identify with these states of mind.  
Bilgrami wants not to be understood as offering a picture of identity that 
is only instrumental, i.e. of identity as something that is meant to last only so 
far as some goals are realized (for example, national independence). He says 
that identity may have a more subtle role in the psychological economy of 
persons. It may be a source of dignity and self-respect when one feels vulner-
able, or of social solidarity when one feels alienation in a social environment. 
This, as we have seen convincingly affirmed by Gilbert, is not necessarily so, 
but it is so for many people. In such cases, says Bilgrami, it is not plausible to 
say that identities are endorsed only instrumentally or temporarily. They ap-
pear to agents as having intrinsic value. From the external standpoint, identi-
ties may be overturned and revised when their function is accomplished. But 
from the internal standpoint, they are conceived as having permanent value 
and not revisable. This can even assume the form that Bilgrami calls „Ulysses 
and the Sirens‟ model‟. In the example that Bilgrami offers this indicates the 
case of members of a community that are aware that under the pressure of 
new social condition they may weaken their original identity commitments. 
In order to prevent such possibility, they realize a politics that entrenches in 
their society the identity related way of life so that it survives even if their 
commitment to their identity will be weaker. The example shows that, from 
the standpoint of members, the identity features have value independently of 
the desires of individuals, as well as of the contingencies that originated them. 
This second-order commitment is something distinctive and not related to 
all desires, even non-instrumental desires. In Bilgrami‟s example, we may 
value intrinsically philosophy, but not in such a way as protecting us from a 
possible change in evaluation, so that we ensure that we will still be working 
on philosophy, even if we will become disinterested about it. In general, we 
support our tendencies only so far as we expect to have them. Contrary to 
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this, in the identity example shown earlier, the support of the tendency was 
not offered only for the time when the tendency existed, but also for the fu-
ture time when it will weaken.  
Now, there is an important part in Bilgrami‟s discussion: “I am not say-
ing, however, that the commitments, values, or desires upon which identities 
are based are immutable or primordial. Not at all. The commitments may 
well change. But from the point of view of the subject who has these com-
mitments, she would like them to be permanent, even if (as she fears) the 
commitments are not permanent. That shows just how deep those commit-
ments are for her. And that is why they are so suitable a basis for defining her 
subjective identity”. (Bilgrami, 2006, 8)  
At the end of the paper, Bilgrami only introduces the normative issue, i.e. 
the question of normative consequences of the two conceptions of identity. As 
he says, the problem of external and internal reasons here becomes important. 
External reasons put normative requirements to individuals independently of 
how they see the issue, while internal reasons depend on the internal norma-
tive outlook of the person. In my opinion, Gilbert has convincingly shown 
that identity and culturalist theories that appeal to the objective concept of 
identity and to external reasons fail. There are simply not objective deep 
identities, and, therefore, anything that supports external moral reasons that 
impose constraints to agents, or that supports identity and cultural oriented 
politics.  
The question is different from the standpoint of the agent herself. As Bil-
grami says, in virtue of her way of seeing her identity, it may be the source of 
deep commitments for her. The subject feels these commitments as a basis for 
political requirements, as well. Here it is important to remember what Gilbert 
says: what one feels as due to her is not necessarily what is due to her. But 
subjective identity as described by Bilgrami influences political and legal de-
cisions from the standpoint of liberal and liberal democratic conceptions of 
justice. I will show now two kinds of exemplification of this. 
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3. Subjective identity and liberalism 
 
For Chandran Kukathas (Kukathas, 2003), subjective commitments are polit-
ically important, because the strongest moral interest that we have is the 
right to live according to our conscience. As a consequence, the political order 
must be so structured as to permit us to live in accordance to our conscience. 
But this is a right that everybody equally has. Consequently, to every person 
it must be permitted to associate with people that share her commitments. 
Such a political structure includes insulated communities, each organized ac-
cording to the deep commitments of its members. However, because of the 
fact that individual conscience is what must be protected, the groups are free 
associations with the right to leave the community. There is no legitimacy in 
protecting the community apart from what its members want. This is, in fact, 
a libertarian order, far distant from the identity and culturalist politics op-
posed by Gilbert, although it seems to me that this order is not fully positive-
ly evaluated by Gilbert, as well.  
The stringency of identity and cultural requirements, as well as internal 
reasons is taken in serious account by authors who endorse the liberal demo-
cratic conception. I will refer to two authors, Joshua Cohen and Samuel 
Freeman.  
Cohen compares his proposal of deliberative democracy with the aggrega-
tive model that he thinks is inferior, and one of the reasons is the limited 
strength the latter has in protecting some identity and cultural demands: 
“The problem may […] trace to a failure to take seriously the stringency of 
the weight of the demands placed on the person by her reasonable moral or 
religious convictions – not the intensity with which she holds those convic-
tions, which does figure in aggregative views, but the stringency or the weight 
of the demands imposed by the convictions, given their content. It is precisely 
this stringency that compels reasons of especially great magnitude for over-
riding those demands. But such considerations about the stringency of de-
mands are absent from the aggregative conception; so, therefore, is the need 
to find reasons of great weight before overriding those demands”. (Cohen, 
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2009, 159-160) On the other hand, “while accepting the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, [deliberative democracy] is attentive to the stringency of demands 
to which agents are subject”. (Cohen, 2009, 160) The question now appears: 
why does democracy have to take in consideration the stringency of demands 
of morality and religion? Before proceeding, I will just briefly indicate that 
the fact that Cohen speaks about religion, while Gilbert about identity pri-
marily related to national belonging is not a problem here. Cohen‟s considera-
tion can be extended to any kind of identity and cultural demand, and so is 
related to Gilbert‟s discussion.  
So, let‟s reformulate the question: why does deliberative democracy have 
to recognize identity and cultural demands in such a strong way? As Cohen 
explains, deliberative democracy institutionalizes the ideal of political justifi-
cation that requires that the exercise of political power must be based on free 
public reasoning among equals, i.e. it frames social and institutional condi-
tions that facilitates this ideal. According to such a conception of democracy, 
citizens regard each other as equals, and this results in a procedure where 
each citizen defends her political requirements by appealing to reasons that 
others “have reason to accept, given the fact of reasonable pluralism and the 
assumption that those others are reasonable”. (Cohen, 2009, 161) It is not suf-
ficient to appeal to reasons that one thinks are true; she must find reasons 
that are compelling to others, while she knows that those others can endorse 
alternative reasonable commitments, and she knows also something about 
their commitments, for example moral or religious commitments that for 
them are overriding.  
Religious commitments are taken by Cohen as particularly important be-
cause they put demands of especially high order to their adherents. Similarly 
to Bilgrami, Cohen says that these adherents take these demands as true, i.e. 
not as self-imposed. But, importantly, he adds that as a consequence, these 
adherents cannot accept a policy based on reasons that impede them to re-
spect the demands of their religion. People who think that such stringent de-
mands are unreasonable, or who treat such demands as only particularly in-
tense preferences show “an unwillingness to see the special role of religious 
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convictions from the point of view of the person who has them”. (Cohen, 
2009, 165) The alternative, supported by Cohen, is to acknowledge that the 
demands impose fundamental obligations reasonably recognized as such by 
the members of a religion, and to accept the duty to find reasons that may 
override such demands if one wants to propose a policy that restricts freedom 
of religion. Cohen says that one will not normally find such reasons, and this 
leads to the wide recognition of freedom of religion. Otherwise, equal citizen-
ship will be denied to the adherents of religions, and there will be a failure of 
democracy from the standpoint of its deliberative conception. 
There is, however, a specification that indicates the limits of Cohen‟s de-
fense of religious commitments: “These points about religious liberty – essen-
tially about its free exercise – do not say anything about how to handle 
claims for religious exemption from general obligations with a strong secular 
justification (including obligations to educate children), or about whether 
special provision is to be made for specifically religious convictions, as distinct 
from conscientious ethical convictions with no religious roots”. (Cohen, 2009, 
166) In relation to this, I say here only that (i) the mutual relation between 
religious requirements and general obligations with a strong secular justifica-
tion must be handled case by case, and (ii) that J.S. Mill has already convin-
cingly argued that ethical convictions with no religious roots deserve the same 
treatment as religious convictions. I will defend the former claim in a future 
work, while I think that Mill‟s arguments for the latter claim are still unde-
feated.  
A position that, for the present discussion, has relevant similarities to Co-
hen‟s is the one put forward by Samuel Freeman, influenced, as Cohen, by 
Rawls‟s theory of public justification. Freeman says that “Only the most 
compelling reasons of justice, those regarding the protection of others‟ fun-
damental rights, should be allowed to outweigh the freedom of religious doc-
trine, sacraments and liturgical practices”. (Freeman, 2002, 24) In Freeman‟s 
opinion, the rigid application of the liberal requirement of equal treatment 
can generate inequalities, because equal treatment under one law can cause 
unequal treatment under another law. So, for example, equal treatment un-
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der the law that prohibits use of (some) drugs can generate unequal treatment 
under the law that ensures freedom of conscience and the related freedom of 
religion. This is the case of Pueblo Indians, for whom the prohibition to use 
peyote interferes directly with a sacramental practice. Freeman‟s conclusion 
is that there must be an exception to the general law in such case not for 
avoiding the damage of someone‟s cultural identity, but in order to respect 
some important right or requirement of justice. In other words, cultural iden-
tity is not affirmed as a primary bearer of rights, as culturalists or identitists 
say, but protection of identity claims is, nevertheless, in cases like the one in-
dicated a strong requirement as a valid public reason. Liberalism cannot sup-
port a policy that enforces “politically the practices of any particular cultural 
group, it politically permits individuals (in effect) to revise their „cultural 
identities‟”. (Freeman, 2002, 29) Here is where a liberal politics departs from 
culturalist and identitist politics. Nevertheless, Freeman, the same as Cohen, 
shows how cultural demands may have an important role in deliberation in a 
liberal democratic framework.  
Cohen and Freeman offer a discussion that is related to Bilgrami‟s subjec-
tive conception of identity (although they do not indicate and do not rely ex-
plicitly on him as a source), and they underlie the importance of the subjec-
tive perspective on normative demands, identifiable with what Bilgrami, with 
a traditional terminology in philosophy, calls internal reasons. The subjective 
perspective may derive from various sources, like the contextual sources of 
identity that Gilbert indicates. But, independently of the origin, what is rele-
vant, according to Cohen and Freeman, is that in a specific moment there are 
reasonable persons who endorse a world view that puts on them stringent re-
quirements, and that these persons perceive these demands as authoritative. 
Although identity requirements are not founded by something objective and 
deep, they are founded by something subjective and deep. This „subjective 
and deep‟ is sufficient to be the source of deep requirements to individuals, in 
the sense of strongly authoritative internal reasons, although frequently not 
perceived as internal by the individuals involved. When these requirements 
are part of a reasonable doctrine, they put limits to public legislation in the 
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sense that they can be overridden only by particularly strong reasons.  
However, it seems to me that from the standpoint of political conse-
quences, this is more a supplement than a criticism. What I have been de-
scribing is a limited defense of the demands of identity. Firstly, it is coherent 
with what is one of the main aspects in Gilbert‟s position, i.e. that there is not 
a privileged position for national identity over other forms of identities. Se-
condly, only reasonable identities are protected. Thirdly, group memberships 
are not delimited previously to what individuals endorse. The consequences of 
this are (A), that it is not necessary that an individual endorses the whole of 
the elements of a cultural world view, and (B) that there is no ground for sup-
porting a cultural identity above what individuals want. In particular, there 
is no ground to support a fixed, instead of a mutable, identity, if it is not the 
individual herself who wants this. This, together with what Cohen and Free-
man say in favor of identity protection, represents the reasonable political 
view about identity. This indicates that everything relevant in relation to cul-
tures and identities is protected inside the boards of liberalism and that no 
specific identity and cultural politics is needed. This seems to me to corres-
pond broadly to Gilbert‟s reflections at the end of his book. But there is a de-
partment from Gilbert‟s view, nonetheless. Considerations on subjective 
depth of identity and on the stringency of identity requirements bear a nor-
mative strength that is absent in Gilbert‟s view. 
 
 
5. Identity and self-respect  
 
The last issue I am going to comment is that of respect, self-respect and rec-
ognition as related to cultural identity. A relevant merit of Gilbert‟s discus-
sion of this issue is that of offering a more subtle distinction than those fre-
quently endorsed in the debate, both on the side of identity and culturalist 
requirements, as well as of some liberal reactions on the other side.  
One of such identity positions is represented by James Tully who tries to 
base identity requirements on the liberally recognized value of self-respect. 
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Tully (Tully, 1995) says that all cultures must be publicly affirmed as of being 
of equal value, otherwise the primary good of self-respect is threatened for the 
people who take part in the cultures that are disvalued. The reason is that 
what a person creates, as well as her life-plans, at least partly depends on her 
cultural identity.  
Tully‟s position is criticized by Barry (Barry, 2001, 267-269). In his opi-
nion, Tully understands in the wrong way Rawls‟s conception of self-respect, 
and, even worse, uses the conception of self-respect wrongly. The basic prob-
lem, as Barry says in coherence with Rawls, is that self-respect is not a good 
that is the object of distribution in the theory of just distribution. Among the 
primary goods there are the social bases of self-respect, and they are consti-
tuted by civic and political rights that are the basis of the equal status as citi-
zens, as well as material goods by which people can realize these rights. Ac-
cordingly, there is no space for the idea that the society must be organized so 
that to each member it must be ensured an equal part in a good assessment of 
other people, independently of what other people think of other citizens and 
of their cultures. (Barry, 2001, 322) 
There is a part of truth in Barry‟s argument, and that part of truth is co-
herent with what Gilbert says in relation to respect attributed to groups and 
their self-respect. Authors like Tully exaggerate in the weight they attribute 
to external respect. As Gilbert says in his discussion of identity as standing, 
the form of identity that is most nearly related to discussions about respect 
and self-respect, external respect is not something that is necessarily needed 
for self-respect: “While identity as standing is a reaction to presumed lack of 
respect and may lead to demands for respect it need not do so, since those 
from whom recognition is demanded may themselves not be respected, so that 
their respect is scorned. […] It is, in fact self-respect that identity as standing 
seeks to secure, not necessarily the respect of others”. (Gilbert, 2010, 74) Here 
we have a major point of agreement between Gilbert and Barry (who refers to 
Rawls): there is no necessity of external respect for self-respect, because self-
respect can be ensured inside the narrow group to which individuals belong. I 
agree with them, and the discussion shows a point where the thesis of identity 
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politics is wrong.  
However, there is a problem for the kind of liberalism defended by Barry, 
as well. For Barry, the social bases of self-respect are related only to civic and 
political rights that are the basis of the equal status as citizens, as well as to 
material goods by which people can realize these rights. The relevant political 
demands are related to these. But Gilbert correctly shows that there is a polit-
ical question related to identity issues, as well: “cultural identity as standing 
is a reaction to another‟s cultural disdain”. (Gilbert, 2010, 180) True, this 
reaction is not universal but contingent, but, nevertheless, it must be taken in 
consideration and met as an aspect of political reality. What is the proper 
reaction?  
The solution must be based on the disentangling of two concepts that ap-
pear as fused in the debate, both on the side of identitists, as well as on the 
side of their critics. One of Gilbert‟s major contributions to the debate is the 
disentanglement of the concepts of respect and recognition. Respect is equiva-
lent to positive evaluation. Recognition is equivalent to affirmation of equal 
status, in the sense of equal status ensured by law and in front of law. I have 
shown exemplifications of recognition in this sense in the examples of Cohen‟s 
and Freeman‟s treatment of cultural requirements.  What Gilbert‟s debate of 
identity as standing shows is that what is permanently needed by groups is 
recognition, while respect may appear only contingently as a requirement. 
We may add that even when it appears, as Barry correctly shows, it cannot 
be taken as something due by justice. (Barry, 2001, 269-271) Moreover, such 
a requirement, as Barry correctly shows, is incompatible with liberalism, be-
cause a person or a group must be left free in the evaluation about whether to 
respect or not to respect another person or another group. On the other hand, 
recognition is a matter of justice, as we have seen earlier in showing Cohen‟s 
and Freeman‟s theses.  
In summary, the mistake of many identity and cultural theorists (in par-
ticular, in the examples provided by Gilbert) is to fuse the issue of respect and 
recognition, where they think that the requirements of respect and recogni-
tion are typical and permanent in the identity issues. Gilbert correctly shows 
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that they are separated, and the expectation of respect is contingent. Barry 
correctly shows that such a requirement is even incompatible with liberalism, 
or, more precisely with the right of people to freely evaluate worldviews and 
ways of living. Here we have identified identitists‟ and culturalists‟ mistake.  
 However, there is a mistake on the side of criticisms of identitists‟ and 
culturalists‟ requirement, and Barry represents an exemplification of the mis-
take. The question that he correctly identifies is that of respect. But there is 
the other question that he does not appear to treat properly, at least in this 
fragment of debate. This is the question about the equal treatment of all cul-
tures by law on the grounds of equality. There are parts of his book when he 
moderates the opposition between his view of egalitarian liberalism and iden-
tity and cultural requirements, but one aspect where he is irremovable is the 
important question of the official use of language. In general, his attitude is 
that equal opportunities for members of minority cultures must be ensured by 
offering them opportunities to learn the majority language. Although this can 
be the only available solution in some contexts, it cannot be taken as the on-
ly, and even not as the primary solution in all cases, as Gilbert correctly re-
marks: “A minority language, to take an obvious example, can put its speak-
ers at a disadvantage in employment, participation in public affairs and so 
forth. Efforts need to be made to minimize these effects by normalizing its use 
wherever possible, including, where appropriate, granting autonomy and lan-
guage protection provisions to territorially concentrated language groups”. 
(Gilbert, 2010, 197) In practice, obviously, it is impossible to recognize always 
linguistic equality to all cultures. But then, a public reason sensitive to the 
context must be offered for why a culture (e.g. in its language manifestation) 
has not equal official status as other cultures. However, I think that it is 
needed to include in recognition more than what is in Gilbert‟s focus. In my 
opinion it is proper to extend public recognition to issues that are not related 
to real material interests only (as is the case of language), which, on the other 
hand appears to represent Gilbert‟s exclusive focus (“I believe that, instead of 
identities, real material interests should be acknowledged and arrangements 
made to serve them”). (Gilbert, 2010, 196) I think that in order to ensure by 
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law equal status of cultures, forms of symbolic recognition must be provided, 
as well as of recognition of traditions or rituals like, for example in the ques-
tion of public holidays or gastronomic issues. 
Support to identity politics in relation to self-respect is frequently op-
posed by remarking the dangers of such politics. As Jeff Spinner-Halev and 
Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2003) say by relying on empirical analysis, building 
self-respect on group self-respect can be dangerous. Group self-respect is often 
built by neglecting differences inside the group, and by idealizing it. At the 
same time, there is the tendency of creating stereotypes of other groups with 
negative connotations. In practice self-respect built on group self-respect ap-
pears as competition and leads to group polarization.  
But what is the alternative? The alternative is to neglect recognition of 
minorities, apart from what is related to their material interests. This can, by 
itself, generate or strengthen group polarization. Jose Brunner and Yoav Pa-
lev (Brunner and Palev, 1996) speak about the position of Palestinians in 
Israel. In part of this community what is by Gilbert called identity as stand-
ing includes, in Brunner‟s and Palev‟s description, such values as having be-
ing deported, or having been put in prison. Such strong asocial forms of iden-
tity as standing are a reaction toward the strongest forms of absence of recog-
nition and deprivation of rights. But lower forms of absence of recognition 
provoke group polarization as well, although in milder forms. It seems, there-
fore, that public recognition of minority identities in aspects related to ma-
terial, as well as symbolic needs, or needs related to rituals, is the most rea-
sonable reaction.  
As conclusion, I remark some points: 
1.  Gilbert successfully defeated objectivist theories of deep identity.  
2. A subjectivist theory of identity that supports deep commitments of 
individuals can be provided. 
3. This subjectivist account does not support any kind of political re-
quirement apart from those coherent with a liberal theory of justice. 
4. The political solution that results broadly corresponds to that endorsed 
by Gilbert, although some of the identity demands have stronger normative 
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power. 
5. Gilbert correctly separates the notions of respect and that of recogni-
tion, and he correctly remarks the contingency of requirement of the former. 
6. Forms of recognition related to material needs must be offered along 
with symbolic recognition and recognition of rituals of minority identities. 
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